In 1973, Colonel Gaddafi has claimed the Gulf of Sirte as Libyan
territorial water, the Gulf was regularly used as a training ground
for the sixth fleet. The Gulf spans some 240 km north to south and 450 km east to west. The sixth Fleet continued to use the Gulf as its training ground in the 70's but during the crisis where US hostages was held in Tehran Iran, the Sixth fleet was forbidden by the Carter administration to sail into the 32'30' north parallel, since Gaddafi was a supporter of the Iranian movement it was decided that nothing should be allowed to exacerbate the situation.
By the time Reagan assumed office , the hostage from Iran was home and in the humiliating failure of the rescuing attempts , the Reagan Administration was in no mood to take another set back .
In the spring of '81 , Vice-Admiral William Bowden , commander of the Sixth fleet , requested permission to ignore the Carter precedent and go back in to the Gulf of Sirte . The request , classified as sensitive was first passed to the US Navy Commander-in-Chief in Europe in Germany , then to the US chief of naval operation in Washington and then finally to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of the Staff , Air Force General, David Jones . The request was then formally placed before the National Security Council (NCS) . The request was well received by the NCS in June and in July 14th , the US decision on staging a huge naval exercise in Sirte was met with unanimous approval in the Reagan Administration and his senior advisors .
3 Days later , Rear-Admiral James Service was summoned to the Pentagon . He was briefed on the various confrontations that they might meet in the Sirte and was formally warned that his pilot should only engage in self defense maneuvers and on no account were they to open fire unprovoked. Service than returned to Naples where he joined the fleet commander Admiral Bowden to begin planning on the forthcoming operation .
On 17 August , a naval force comprising of 14 Cruiser and Destroyer and 2 aircraft carrier, USS Forrestal and USS Nimitz (carrying about 150 aircraft between them ) sailed into the Gulf of Sirte . During the first 2 days of the exercise , Nimitz using five radar computer linked defense system with a range of 800km , spotted Libyan intruders 72 times . Despite warning that live ammunition would be used , the Libyan fighter intends to fly over the Gulf . Given that Gulf of Sirte was at least an international water , the Libyan intends would try to disrupt the exercise by forcing the American not to use live ammunition incase of hitting a Libyan fighter .
The US responses to the Libyan fighters are always the same . Fighters already patrolling or launched from the deck of Nimitz would intercept the Libyan fighters and force them away, usually the Libyan fighters responded by returning to mainland space .
On 19 August , however , the Libyan response was completely different. Shortly after 0700 hours , Nimitz's radar locked on 2 soviet built SU-22 , heading into the Gulf . The two fighters was also spotted by a Hawkeye patrolling in the Gulf at 21,000 m. At the same time 2 F-14 Tomcat from the Black Ace squadron piloted by Cdr. Henry Kleeman and Lt. Dave Venlet of the 102 aircraft and the 107 tomcat piloted by Lt. Larry Muczynski and Lt.
James (Jim) Anderson ( VF-41 ) which was based on the Nimitz was also on patrol . As the two SU-22 closed in, the Tomcats were ordered to intercept them . With the two Tomcat coming head on, the Libyan fighters fired off one missile , passed underneath the Tomcat , banked steeply and fired another . The Libyan pilots would have know that the missile would definitely miss the Tomcat, firstly the Atoll missiles are heat seeker which means it could not possibly lock-on an on coming aircraft, secondly even if the SU-22 managed to get behind the Tomcat , the Tomcats extraordinary performance could out run the atoll in 8km.
Following the Strict regulation to offensive and defensive action, the US pilot , once fired upon was free to take action . With a 480km/hr advantage over the soviet counterparts , the Tomcat found very little difficulty on maneuvering to a firing position on the SU-22 , which by then was already fleeing back to the mainland. Plane 102 piloted by Kleeman fired off an AIM-9 and destroyed the SU-22 , while the other tomcat fired off a sidewinder which hit the plane but the missile failed to detonate.
After the Incident both sides launched a diplomatic protest. Gaddafi used this incident to strengthen his position as a third world champion and strengthen his anti-American campaign . For the pro-western countries the incident provided a comforting demonstration of American military presence.
In Libya, on 19 August 1981, Khadafi sent two Sukoi Su-22 fighter jets to take on a
couple of United States fighter jets: The F-14 Tomcat, resulting in the loss of two Su-22 jets. Again, on January 15th, 1986, Khadafi
challenged the US Naval forces by sending two MiG-23 Floggers to test the American
military and find out how far they could push the US. The MiG's vectored on two A-6 Intruder's, after which the A-6's turned away, and two
Tomcats on CAP (combat air patrol) were sent to meet the
MiG's head-on. Previous encounters with the Libyan Air Force resulted with the Libyan aircraft turning, and returning back to Libyan
airspace. This encounter was not going to end so easily. What was probably the most publicized air-combat sequence
that took place and lasted over 6 minutes, an eternity to the pilots and RIOs flying the two
Tomcats involved in this battle.
The end result was still the same. US-4, Libya-0.
